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LETTERS TO LANGUAGE
Language accepts letters from readers that
briefly and succinctly respond to or comment
upon either material published previously in
the journal or issues deemed of importance to
the field. The editor reserves the right to edit
letters as needed. Brief replies from relevant




In the article derived from his 2008 Presi-
dential address (‘The logical structure of lin-
guistic theory’, Language 84.795–814, 2008),
Stephen Anderson makes two misleading state-
ments about how evidence might bear on lan-
guage acquisition, one relating to corpus use
and the other to typological generalizations.
His errors have been made previously in the
literature, and should not be repeated in Lan-
guage without correction.
Anderson discusses a familiar claim of
Noam Chomsky’s: that children do not learn
from experience that the formation principles
for interrogatives in English are structure-
sensitive rather than string-sensitive. Take the
facts in 1.
(1) a. Everything that wasn’t eaten
will be thrown away.
b. Will everything that wasn’t
eaten be thrown away?
c. *Wasn’t everything that eaten
will be thrown away?
Comparing 1b with its corresponding declara-
tive in 1a reveals that the simple string-sensi-
tive hypothesis in 2 is wrong.
(2) The first auxiliary in the declarative
must be positioned initially in the
corresponding interrogative.
This hypothesis would predict 1c. I will call
sentences like 1b telltale sentences, since their
testimony brings out the difference between the
first auxiliary in the string and the auxiliary
that follows the subject of the clause. If lan-
guage were learned from the evidence provided
by experience, then encountering telltale sen-
tences would help the learner by permitting 2
to be eliminated. But Chomsky claimed that
‘A person might go through much or all of
his life without ever having been exposed to
relevant evidence’ (Language and learning:
The debate between Jean Piaget and Noam
Chomsky, ed. by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini,
Harvard UP, 1980, pp. 40, also 114–15)—that
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is, evidence that would confirm the correct hy-
pothesis over the tempting but incorrect one
in 2. In other words, he claimed that telltale
sentences are so rare that you might well never
encounter one in your whole life.
Pullum & Barbara C. Scholz 2002 (‘Empiri-
cal assessment of stimulus poverty arguments’,
The Linguistic Review 19.9–50; and before that
Pullum 1996, ‘Learnability, hyperlearning, and
the poverty of the stimulus’, Berkeley Linguis-
tics Society 22.498–513) probed that claim a
little by looking in a readily available body
of text, the Wall Street Journal corpus (WSJ).
Telltale sentences showed up immediately.
However, Anderson remarks: ‘one might well
question the extent to which the Wall Street
Journal is representative of the input to the
child’ (804).
People have said such things before: Jerry
Fodor (‘Doing without what’s within: Fiona
Cowie’s critique of nativism’, Mind 110.99–
148, 2001; relying on a discussion in Cowie’s
What’s within (Oxford UP, 1999) of the prelim-
inary report in Pullum 1996); Janet D. Fodor
and Carrie Crowther Fodor (‘Understanding
stimulus poverty arguments’, The Linguistic
Review 19.105–45, 2002, pp. 108–14); and
Cedric Boeckx and Norbert Hornstein (‘Les
diffe´rents objectifs de la linguistique the´orique
[The varying aims of linguistic theory]’, Ca-
hier Chomsky, ed. by Julie Franck and Jean
Bricmont, 61–77, L’Herne, 2007). People offer
their armchair opinion that WSJ could not be
relevant, but no one goes back and checks WSJ.
The first telltale sentence in WSJ’s forty-four
million words is the sixteenth interrogative that
occurs, and it is not an instance of financial
journalistic prose or an editorial about capital-
ism. It is a nine-word sentence from sponta-
neous speech, the penultimate sentence of this
passage:
Afterward, one of Mr. Tsongas’s partners at the
Boston law firm of Foley, Hoag & Eliot, told him:
‘You’ve been invited to join your last corporate
board.’
Mr. Tsongas says he is puzzled by such observa-
tions. ‘Is what I’m doing in the shareholders’ best
interest? Then what’s the problem?’
It is just wrong to assert that WSJ cannot pro-
vide any evidence that might bear on child lan-
guage acquisition, because there is no reason
to think sentences of the sort Mr. Tsongas ut-
tered in the above passage will be absent from
the speech that children hear.
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Who knows how many times children hear
Will whoever is making that noise please stop?,
or Could those who have to leave early sit over
here?. I don’t (though I know I heard an ordi-
nary person say Is what you’re doing enough?
when speaking spontaneously to a reporter on
the BBC World Service). What WSJ shows us
immediately is that whatever the frequency of
telltale sentences in unscripted speech, it is cer-
tainly higher than Chomsky asserted.
WSJ does not have to be ‘representative of
the input to the child’ to be relevant for the
purpose Pullum and Scholz had in mind; it only
needs to contain a sample of things real people
actually say. (Essentially this point is made in
Scholz & Pullum 2002:206–8, ‘Searching for
arguments to support linguistic nativism’,
which appeared in the same issue of The Lin-
guistic Review (19.185–223) as the one Ander-
son cites, but he does not mention it.) In any
case, telltale sentences turned out to be present
in every corpus Pullum and Scholz looked at.
Anderson then gives a second argument for
setting Pullum & Scholz 2002 aside. He says
that Julie Legate and Charles Yang ‘develop a
precise account of the statistical prominence in
the input data that seems to be necessary, and
show that the level attained by [telltale sen-
tences] is far below this threshold’ (‘Empirical
re-assessment of stimulus poverty arguments’,
The Linguistic Review 19.151–62, 2002). But
Legate and Yang do no such thing. They supply
an estimated frequency of 1.2% for existential
clauses in child-directed speech and an esti-
mated frequency of 0.068% for telltale sen-
tences, and note that the latter is 40 times
smaller. That is backing up a hunch with a cou-
ple of ballpark guesses, not ‘a precise account
of statistical prominence in the input data’.
Nonetheless, Legate and Yang’s argument,
while not statistical in nature, is a complex and
interesting one. It can be summarized roughly
as follows.
(i) Assume that languages fall into two
types, optional-subject (‘pro-drop’)
and obligatory-subject.
(ii) Assume that noticing that existential
clauses with there-type expletives,
and nothing else, triggers learning that
a language is of the obligatory-subject
type.
(iii) Assume that noticing telltale sen-
tences, andnothing else, triggers learn-
ing that2 isan incorrectgeneralization.
(iv) If the trigger for learning about oblig-
atory subjects is 40 times more fre-
quent than the trigger for learning 2,
then children should learn the former
generalization long before the latter.
(v) But this is not so: children seem to
learn both at around the same time (by
about a month or two after their third
birthday).
(vi) Therefore there are too few telltale
clauses to trigger learning from expe-
rience.
(vii) Yet children do learn that 2 is wrong.
(viii) Therefore not all learning is from ex-
perience, so the thesis of linguistic na-
tivism is true.
This argument certainly deserves attention.
And it has received it, though Anderson does
not note that. It is answered in detail in
Scholz & Pullum 2002:217–21. The core prob-
lem is that Legate and Yang attribute the claim
about the crucial status of clauses with there-
type expletives to Nina Hyams (Language ac-
quisition and the theory of parameters, D. Rei-
del, 1986). But Hyams made at least half a
dozen clearly false or highly dubious assump-
tions, which Scholz and Pullum list (pp.
218–20).
Perhaps the most important point is that par-
titioning the languages of the world into two
types, optional-subject and obligatory-subject,
is a hopeless oversimplification. When consid-
ered in the context of the complex and subtle
conditions governing subject omission in ‘par-
tial pro-drop languages’ like colloquial Finnish
or Estonian, it looks absurdly simplistic (see
e.g. Outi Duvallon and Antoine Chalvin, ‘La
re´alisation ze´ro du pronom sujet de premie`re
et de deuxie`me personne du singulier en finnois
et en estonien parle´s’, Linguistica Uralica
4.270–86, 2004).
Perhaps in due course arguments like the one
Legate and Yang attempt might enable us to
find out whether or not young children hear
enough telltale sentences in everyday speech
to permit experience-based learning of the prin-
ciples of interrogative formation. It is worth
trying to find out. Scholz and Pullum (2002:
220–21) point out an interesting datum that
might play a role in this enterprise (the fre-
quency of there-type expletives in Danish is
double the English frequency, which under a
nonnativist view might suggest that Danish
children should learn certain aspects of lan-
guage at a faster rate). But essentially all of the
work remains to be done.
It is not enough simply to wrinkle one’s nose
at the Wall Street Journal, wave an arm in the
direction of the ‘pro-drop parameter’, and
move on. The question of whether telltale sen-
tences might be relevant to the learning of aux-
iliary placement remains open as far as I can
see. Anderson is only the latest of quite a few
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writers to treat the issue too lightly and dismiss
nonnativist positions too swiftly. The impor-
tant question of whether the typical child’s lin-
guistic experience is just too meager to support




Anderson replies: Professor Pullum’s response
seems to me to fall rather wide of the mark as
a criticism of my article. He accuses me of ‘two
misleading statements about how evidence
might bear on language acquisition, one relat-
ing to corpus use and the other to typological
generalizations’.
The first of these supposed errors lies in un-
derestimating the representativeness of the
Wall Street Journal corpus as evidence for the
input to the child learner. This he rebuts by
citing the sentence Is what I’m doing in the
shareholders’ best interest? from that corpus.
While I did not assert that such sentences ‘will
be absent from the speech that children hear’,
I am not convinced by this example that the
WSJ provides us with the data necessary to as-
sess just what sentence types children base
their grammars on.
In any event, I accepted Legate and Yang’s
(2002) observation that at least some such sen-
tences are to be found in the somewhat more
representative corpora in CHILDES, though
quite infrequently; this was the basis of my
reference to their paper. We know what chil-
dren hear includes many actual utterances that
are not in accord with the grammars they con-
struct: corpora of natural speech include many
false starts, mistaken continuations, and other
literally ungrammatical sentences, but children
are not misled by these. Legate and Yang’s
point was that a sentence type needs to attain
a certain level of prominence in the child’s
input to constitute reliable evidence, and they
suggested that a study of available corpora (in-
cluding WSJ and CHILDES) shows that sen-
tences of the type necessary to lead to a
structure-sensitive account of auxiliary-inver-
EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT
With the publication of this issue, Gregory T. Stump’s term as Review Editor ends. We all
owe Greg a great deal for his outstanding efforts in that capacity. The new Review Editor is
Natsuko Tsujimura of Indiana University.
sion constructions probably do not reach that
threshold.
The second error of which I am accused
seems to be that of treating this issue by ‘wav-
[ing] an arm in the direction of the ‘‘pro-drop
parameter’’, and mov[ing] on’, which I find
quite incomprehensible, as I made no reference
that I can detect to the pro-drop parameter or
anything else that could motivate this criticism.
Legate and Yang’s discussion does touch on
this, but their article focused on structure-sensi-
tivity in auxiliary inversion, and that was the
sense in which I cited it. They may well not
have identified the exact level of significance
necessary for relevant data to support grammar
construction in the child learner, but surely
some such factor must be a basic part of any
inductive learner, and I do not think Pullum’s
caustic dismissal of their paper advances his
argument very far.
In any event, in discussing the results from
sophisticated inductive learning systems such
as those developed by Joshua Tenenbaum and
his colleagues, I explicitly admitted (at least
for the sake of argument) that such a system
might be able to arrive at structure-sensitivity
as a property of grammars even with little or
no evidence of the sort that has been the bone
of contention in this dispute. The point of my
discussion here, rather, was to question the
plausibility of the claim that structure-sensitiv-
ity is a contingent property of grammars, ar-
rived at by a rather elaborate induction. Given
that all known grammars of all of the world’s
languages in fact display this property, it would
seem that child learners never go astray in this
regard. That suggests (though it does not con-
clusively demonstrate) that they do not spend
time on this issue, never in fact entertaining
alternative, non-structure-sensitive views of
grammar. And that, in its turn, suggests that
structure-sensitivity plausibly derives from the
nature of the Language faculty. An argument
from the poverty of the stimulus might suffice
to establish that conclusion, but it is not, I think,
strictly necessary.
STEPHEN R. ANDERSON
[sra@yale.edu]
